Economic Theory
Game theory, mechanism design, and microeconomic foundations.
econ.TH · 87 papersPreplay Losing Contracts: Inducing Strong Nash Equilibrium in the $n$-player Prisoner's Dilemma
This paper introduces 'losing contracts' to induce robust cooperation as the unique strong Nash equilibrium in the n-player Prisoner's Dilemma without side payments.
Post-AGI Economies: Autonomy and the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics
This paper re-evaluates the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics for post-AGI economies, considering varying degrees of AI autonomy.
Causal Persuasion
This paper proposes a model of causal persuasion, showing it's easier to establish a causal link than to debunk one.
Convex Duality in Perturbed Utility Route Choice
This paper introduces a convex duality framework for perturbed utility route choice, transforming a complex problem into an efficiently solvable one.
On Rent Dissipation in Dynamic Multi-battle Contests
This paper studies dynamic multi-battle contests, identifying "exchangeability" as a key property influencing rent dissipation and providing conditions for almost-full dissipation.
How damaging is zero-sum thinking to an agent's interests when the world is positive-sum?
Zero-sum thinking (maximin) isn't always harmful in positive-sum worlds; it can even outperform Nash equilibrium, challenging common evolutionary views.
Fair Commodity Taxation
This paper analyzes how correlation in consumer valuations affects fairness in monopolistic markets and the role of taxation.
Pseudo-Substitutability: A Maximal Domain for Pairwise Stability in Matching Markets with Contracts
This paper introduces pseudo-substitutable preferences, a maximal domain that extends classical substitutability to guarantee pairwise stability in contract markets.
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture when agents have needs
This paper proposes need-adjusted geometric and serial rules for distributing revenues in hierarchical ventures, considering individual agent needs.
Perceived Social Norms under Uncertainty
This paper introduces a belief-based framework for social norms, allowing individuals to be uncertain about what is appropriate and how information shapes their perceptions.
Optimal linear-payment auction design with aftermarket collaboration
This paper designs optimal linear-payment auctions for scenarios with post-auction collaboration, addressing double moral hazard and adverse selection.
Strategic Pricing and Consumer Welfare under One-Sided Price Regulation
A study on one-sided price regulation shows it can strategically raise expected average prices and decrease consumer welfare, contrary to its intent.
Decomposition Envy-Freeness in Random Assignment
Introduces Decomposition Envy-Freeness (Dec-EF) to address envy in random assignment decompositions, showing its existence for specific cases.
Optimal Insurance Menu Design under the Expected-Value Premium Principle
This paper designs optimal insurance menus under asymmetric information, showing how to screen risk attitudes and types with specific pricing structures.
Knowing that you do not know everything
Rational agents, even with true and refinable knowledge, cannot determine if they know everything or not.
How do you know you won't like it if you've (never) tried it? Preference discovery and data design
This paper introduces a data-design framework showing how firms shape consumer preference discovery through bundled consumption experiences.
Sandpile Economics: Theory, Identification, and Evidence
Sandpile Economics explains how evolving production networks' geometric fragility leads to disproportionate economic crises, using Forman-Ricci curvature.
Balanced Contributions in Networks and Games with Externalities
This paper introduces the unique Balanced Contributions and Component-Efficient (BCE) rule for allocating value in networks with externalities.
On the Design of Stochastic Electricity Auctions
This paper proposes a new design for day-ahead electricity auctions that accounts for renewable energy uncertainty by conditioning contracts on "states of the world."
How to Use Prices for Efficient Online Matching
This paper introduces the Sequential Equilibrium Mechanism (SEM), an online matching algorithm that achieves asymptotically efficient, fair, and strategy-proof assignments.
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