Economic Theory
Game theory, mechanism design, and microeconomic foundations.
econ.TH · 87 papersHuman-AI Productivity Paradoxes: Modeling the Interplay of Skill, Effort, and AI Assistance
A new model explains how increased AI assistance can paradoxically degrade productivity and polarize skills due to unreliability or skill development.
A Theory of Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium in NeuroAI
MIE is a new game-theoretic framework for NeuroAI, extending Nash equilibrium to intelligent systems with internal computation, partial observability, and bounded rationality.
Aggregating Elo Ratings: An Axiomatization
This paper axiomatizes how to combine multiple Elo ratings into a single scalar rating using a unique weighted strength averaging rule.
The Endogeneity of Miscalibration: Impossibility and Escape in Scored Reporting
This paper reveals an endogeneity in AI oversight: smooth scoring rules fail to elicit truthful reports from strategic agents, but sharp, step-function thresholds offer a solution.
Aggregate Stable Matching with Money Burning
This paper introduces aggregate stable matching with "money burning" (waiting) to clear decentralized markets, proving equilibrium existence and uniqueness.
Coordination Mechanisms with Partially Specified Probabilities
This paper characterizes implementable outcomes in coordination mechanisms when players have only partially specified probabilities, using maximum-entropy inference.
Mental Health and Human Capital Composition in a Dynastic OLG Model with PAYG Pensions
This paper models mental health as a key human capital input in an OLG model, showing how PAYG pensions affect fertility and child quality.
Response Time Enhances Alignment with Heterogeneous Preferences
This paper shows that using user response times can accurately align LLMs with diverse human preferences, overcoming limitations of standard choice-only methods.
Sustaining Cooperation in Populations Guided by AI: A Folk Theorem for LLMs
This paper proves a folk theorem for LLMs, showing how shared AI guidance can sustain cooperation among agents with misaligned incentives.
Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive Valuations
This paper presents counterexamples showing that EFX allocations do not always exist for submodular and subadditive valuations, even with symmetric agents.
A Simple Method for School Choice Lotteries
A simple polynomial-time method for school choice lotteries ensures ex ante stability, equal treatment, and non-domination.
An Axiomatic Foundation for Decisions with Counterfactual Utility
This paper provides an axiomatic foundation for counterfactual utility, extending vNM theory to potential outcomes to ensure coherence and resolve paradoxes.
The Adversarial Discount - AI, Signal Correlation, and the Cybersecurity Arms Race
A model of AI-driven cybersecurity arms races reveals how signal correlation neutralizes attacker advantages and highlights defense inefficiencies.
Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions
Public communication dominates private messaging in collective decisions with conflicting agent interests.
Unsecured Lending via Delegated Underwriting
A new mechanism enables unsecured lending for pseudonymous users through delegated underwriting, avoiding collateral and centralized systems.
Uncountably many conditionally inaccessible decisions exist in every finite probability space
Uncountably many conditionally inaccessible decisions exist in every finite probability space, proving subjective probabilities can hinder objectively good choices.
Equilibrium Stability and Uniqueness with a Large Number of Commodities and Patient Consumers
This paper demonstrates that a large effective number of commodities and patient consumers lead to equilibrium stability and uniqueness in exchange economies.
Truthful Communication and Exclusive Information Clubs
This paper explores how strategic misreporting shapes communication networks, finding that truthful communication occurs in cliques but stable networks may not be socially efficient.
Misspecified beliefs and the evolution of peer pressure
This paper shows how peer pressure emerges from misspecified beliefs, leading to self-confirming equilibria and informational rents.
The Design and Composition of Structural Causal Decision Processes
Introduces Structural Causal Decision Models (SCDMs) and Processes (SCDPs), new causal frameworks for modeling resource-rational agents in complex computing systems.
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