Uncountably many conditionally inaccessible decisions exist in every finite probability space
Zalán Gyenis, Miklós Rédei, Leszek Wroński
TLDR
Uncountably many conditionally inaccessible decisions exist in every finite probability space, proving subjective probabilities can hinder objectively good choices.
Key contributions
- Proves uncountably many conditionally inaccessible decisions exist in any finite probability space.
- Shows for any subjective probability, uncountably many objective probabilities lead to such decisions.
- Identifies uncountably many utility function pairs representing these inaccessible decisions.
- Illustrates how subjective probabilities can prevent objectively good decisions.
Why it matters
This paper significantly extends decision theory by proving the widespread existence of conditionally inaccessible decisions. It reveals a fundamental limitation: an agent's subjective beliefs can prevent objectively optimal choices. This has profound implications for modeling rational agents.
Original Abstract
In a recent paper \cite{Redei-Jing2026} the notion of conditional $p$-inaccessibility of a decision based on utility maximization was defined and examples of conditionally $p$-inaccessible decisions were given. The conditional inaccessibility of a decision based on maximizing utility calculated by a probability measure $p^*$ expresses that the decision cannot be obtained if the expectation values of the utility functions are calculated using the (Jeffrey) conditional probability measure obtained by conditioning $p$ on partial evidence about the probability $p^*$ that determines the decision. The paper \cite{Redei-Jing2026} conjectured that conditionally $p$-inaccessible decisions exist in some probability spaces having arbitrary large finite number of elementary events. In this paper we prove that for any $p$ in any finite probability space there exist an uncountable number of probability measures $p^*$ for each of which there exist an uncountable number of pairs of utility functions that represent conditionally $p$-inaccessible decisions. If $p^*$ is an objective probability determining objectively good decisions and $p$ is the subjective probability determining a rational decision of a decision making Agent, the result says that there is an enormous number of decision situations in which the Agent's subjective probability prohibits the Agent's informed rational decision to be objectively good.
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