A Simple Method for School Choice Lotteries
TLDR
A simple polynomial-time method for school choice lotteries ensures ex ante stability, equal treatment, and non-domination.
Key contributions
- Proposes a simple polynomial-time method for school choice lotteries.
- Constructs an ex ante stable lottery satisfying equal treatment of equals (ETE).
- Applies ETE reassignment to a constrained efficient stable matching.
- Generates lotteries not ordinally dominated by other ex ante stable lotteries.
Why it matters
This paper offers a practical and efficient solution for designing fair school choice lotteries. By ensuring stability and equal treatment, it helps create more equitable allocation systems. Its non-domination property is a significant theoretical advancement.
Original Abstract
This note proposes a simple polynomial-time method for constructing an ex ante stable school-choice lottery satisfying equal treatment of equals. The method applies the ETE reassignment to a constrained efficient stable matching and yields a lottery that is not ordinally dominated by any other ex ante stable lottery.
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