Incorporating the underuse problem in the tragedy of the commons

Original Abstract

The tragedy of the commons has traditionally been framed as a problem of resource overuse driven by self-interested exploitation. In contrast, growing empirical evidence shows that insufficient use or abandonment of natural resources, known as underuse, can also lead to ecological degradation and loss of ecosystem services. Despite its relevance, underuse has rarely been examined within evolutionary theories of resource use. Here, we develop a simple eco-evolutionary model that integrates both provisioning and non-provisioning ecosystem services to analyze the evolution of resource-use strategies. Using adaptive dynamics, we investigate how individual resource use evolves while altering resource abundance. The model shows that overuse and underuse arise naturally as alternative evolutionary outcomes of the same underlying process, alongside intermediate use and evolutionary branching. We derive analytical conditions for the existence, number, and stability of evolutionarily singular strategies, and show that the qualitative evolutionary fate is primarily determined by the shape of provisioning benefits. Only when provisioning benefits increase in a concave manner does evolutionary dynamics converge to a unique intermediate strategy that is continuously stable. In contrast, convex increasing benefits generate a broader range of outcomes: overuse, underuse, bi-stability, and evolutionary branching. By explicitly comparing the continuously stable strategy with the socially optimal strategy, we further quantify how their deviations depend on the valuation of non-provisioning services. Our results provide a theoretical framework for viewing the common-pool resource dilemmas as intrinsically two-sided evolutionary problems, and offer a baseline for future studies exploring interventions to address overuse and underuse simultaneously.