Preventing Distinguishability between Multiplication and Squaring Operations
Alkistis Aikaterini Sigourou, Zoya Dyka, Peter Langendoerfer, Ievgen Kabin
TLDR
This paper addresses a side-channel vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication by preventing attackers from distinguishing multiplication from squaring operations.
Key contributions
- SCA can distinguish multiplication from squaring in ECC scalar operations.
- Vulnerability stems from energy differences in field multipliers for distinct vs. identical operands.
- This side-channel vulnerability persists regardless of the specific multiplication method used.
- Two mitigation techniques, data redirection and bus reloading, were implemented and analyzed.
Why it matters
ECC scalar multiplication is a critical operation, often targeted by Side-Channel Analysis. This paper identifies a fundamental vulnerability where attackers can distinguish multiplication from squaring operations. It proposes and analyzes practical mitigation techniques to enhance ECC security against these sophisticated attacks.
Original Abstract
Scalar multiplication kP is a critical operation in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC), often targeted by Side-Channel Analysis (SCA). Despite strategies based on atomic patterns to enhance security, the binary kP algorithms remain susceptible to simple SCA due to energy consumption variations in field multipliers during passing two different or two identical operands. This vulnerability arises independent of the multiplication method used. We implemented and analysed two mitigation techniques: one involving data redirection and another focusing on bus reloading.
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