Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback
TLDR
This paper shows that dynamic interaction in cheap talk games without feedback partially restores commitment, allowing specific persuasion model payoffs to be achieved.
Key contributions
- Studies dynamic sender-receiver games where the sender lacks feedback on receiver actions.
- Demonstrates that dynamic interaction partially restores commitment for the sender.
- Achieves equilibrium payoffs from persuasion models with partial commitment.
- Shows state-independent sender payoffs can reach the Bayesian persuasion optimum.
Why it matters
This paper is significant as it reveals how commitment can emerge in dynamic communication games even without direct feedback. It expands our understanding of information transmission and strategic interaction, offering insights for designing communication protocols.
Original Abstract
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff.
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