On Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
TLDR
This paper demonstrates that Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths are the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior in repeated games.
Key contributions
- Shows that any nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths.
- Establishes that the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself forms a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.
- Identifies Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths as the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.
Why it matters
This research clarifies the relationship between two key game theory concepts: Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior and Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium. By identifying PCE as the maximal CSSB, it provides a deeper understanding of stability in coalitional repeated games. This has implications for analyzing strategic interactions.
Original Abstract
We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths itself is a nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior. The set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium paths is therefore the maximal nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior.
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